Competition

Colliers reports in three segments — Commercial Real Estate, Engineering, and Investment Management — and each one meets a different set of rivals. The company describes itself as serving corporate and institutional clients in 33 countries, or 70 including affiliates and franchisees [1]. In FY2025 those segments produced revenues of $3,290.6M, $1,734.9M and $532.3M respectively, and Segment Adjusted EBITDA of $366.9M, $164.7M and $214.8M [2]. The segment labels are themselves in motion: the company realigned its Commercial Real Estate and Engineering segments to reflect new management reporting lines effective in the first quarter of 2026 [3].

This tab records who the rivals are, what their own filings say, and what the contracts underneath the revenue actually specify. The arena's structure and value-chain economics sit in Industry; the raw filings shelf sits in Competitors.

The comparator set below was not taken from a screen. Four of the six names were confirmed from the rivals' own disclosure. Cushman and Wakefield's Competition section names "Colliers International Group Inc. (Nasdaq: CIGI)" alongside JLL and CBRE, while describing itself as "one of the three largest global commercial real estate services firms" [4]. Newmark's competition disclosure lists Colliers among CBRE, JLL, Cushman and Wakefield and Savills, plus specialists including Eastdil Secured, Walker and Dunlop, Berkadia and Trimont [5]. JLL names Colliers among its primary competitors [6], and CBRE includes Colliers in the peer group it uses for relative total shareholder return [7]. WSP Global and Stantec are engineering and design firms; neither names Colliers, and their reporting model differs enough that they are held out of the like-for-like economics below.

Where the Overlap Sits

Source: segment structures per CBRE FY2025 10-K [8], JLL FY2025 10-K [9], Cushman and Wakefield FY2025 10-K [10], Newmark FY2025 10-K [11], WSP FY2025 annual report [12] and Stantec FY2025 annual report [13].

Stantec reports that no individual customer exceeds 10% of its gross revenue, and splits that revenue across Infrastructure, Water, Buildings, Environmental, and Energy and Resources rather than by property type [14]. Colliers' engineering business is organised around the same disciplines, which is why the two are comparators for that segment only.

Scale Across Three Years

Revenue as reported, $ billions. Colliers per pinned company facts; CBRE segment note [15]; JLL results of operations [9]; Cushman and Wakefield Item 1 [10]; Newmark results of operations [11].

The ranking is stable and the gap is wide. CBRE's FY2025 revenue of $40,550M is more than seven times Colliers' $5,558.5M [15] [16].

Two Revenue Rulers

Most of that gap is pass-through. CBRE separately discloses pass-through costs of $16,746M inside its FY2025 revenue, being reimbursable costs of subcontracted third-party vendor work [15]. JLL carries $17,158.2M of gross contract costs against FY2025 revenue of $26,115.6M [9]. Cushman and Wakefield reports total service line fee revenue of $7,061.3M and gross contract reimbursables of $3,226.9M within total revenue of $10,288.2M [17]. Colliers reports FY2025 revenues of $5,558.5M and Net Revenues of $4,866.5M [16].

Reported revenue less each company's own disclosed pass-through line: CBRE pass-through costs [15], JLL gross contract costs [9], Cushman and Wakefield service line fee revenue [17], Colliers Net Revenues [16]. Newmark is excluded: it discloses no comparable pass-through line.

On the reported basis Colliers is the smallest of the four; on the net basis it is still the smallest, but the ratio to JLL narrows from about five times to under two. The two rulers also change what a margin means. Cushman and Wakefield states an Adjusted EBITDA margin of 9.3% for FY2025, an increase of 46 basis points, measured against service line fee revenue rather than total revenue [18]. Any margin comparison that mixes the two denominators is arithmetic without meaning.

Growth and Margin, FY2025

Pinned company and peer facts for FY2025. Peer median revenue growth 12.3%; peer median operating margin 6.4%. Operating margins here are struck on each company's reported revenue, so the pass-through-heavy outsourcers sit structurally lower.

The ordering carries the denominator problem from the previous exhibit. CBRE, JLL and Cushman and Wakefield cluster between 4.2% and 4.4% because their reported revenue includes reimbursables that carry no margin; Colliers at 7.2% and Newmark at 8.4% carry less pass-through. WSP at 9.7% and Stantec at 8.8% are engineering firms on a third basis again.

Segment Economics

Colliers segmented information, $ millions, FY2025 [2] and FY2024 comparatives [19]. Segment Adjusted EBITDA is a company-defined measure that excludes nine categories of item and is struck before indirect operating costs as the company defines them.

Investment Management earned $214.8M of Segment Adjusted EBITDA on $532.3M of revenue, roughly the same absolute contribution as Engineering on a third of the revenue. Within the Commercial Real Estate segment, Colliers disaggregates FY2025 revenue into Leasing $1,178.8M, Capital Markets $885.0M, Property management $545.5M, and Valuation and advisory $531.3M [20]. Cushman and Wakefield's equivalent split runs Services, Leasing, Capital markets and Valuation at 66%, 21%, 8% and 5% of revenue, but 51%, 30%, 12% and 7% of fee revenue, with the United States at 69% of 2025 revenue [10]. Colliers' August 2026 investor presentation puts 15,400 professionals behind a $3.9B Commercial Real Estate platform, 12,000 behind a $1.9B Engineering platform, and 600 behind Investment Management [21].

The Engineering Comparators

Millions in each company's own reporting currency; no common-currency series is disclosed, so the figures are not converted. WSP segment note [12], Stantec Note 33 [13], Colliers Note 27 [2].

Three companies, three earnings definitions, two currencies. WSP measures segments on net revenues and Adjusted EBITDA by segment, with head office corporate costs held outside the segments entirely [12]; Stantec bridges gross revenue to net revenue to project margin, which sits above overhead rather than below it [13]. Both also report on geography rather than discipline, so the comparison to Colliers Engineering holds at the level of end markets and headcount, not at the level of margin. Colliers discloses 12,000 engineering professionals, with 4,200 in Canada, 3,200 in the United States, 1,700 in Europe, 1,400 in Asia-Pacific, 1,200 in Latin America and 300 in the Middle East [22].

What Rivals Say

Rival disclosures naming Colliers: JLL [6], CBRE [7], Cushman and Wakefield [4], Newmark [5].

Cushman and Wakefield's phrasing places Colliers outside the top three by its own count: the registrant describes itself as "one of the three largest global commercial real estate services firms" while listing Colliers as a competitor [4]. Newmark's list is the widest, running past the global firms to Eastdil Secured, Walker and Dunlop, Berkadia, Knight Frank, NAI Global, SitusAMC and Trimont — the specialists that compete for individual service lines rather than whole mandates [5]. No rival discloses a market share figure for Colliers or for itself.

Share and Pricing

Ordered oldest to newest. Colliers Q1 2024 call [23], Cushman and Wakefield Q3 2025 call [24], CBRE FY2025 10-K [25], JLL FY2025 10-K [26], JLL Q2 2026 call [27], Colliers Q2 2026 call [28].

Every share claim in that table is management characterization. None of the six companies publishes a measured share series, and the two most recent claims are not compatible with each other on their face: JLL's chief financial officer says the firm is "confident from our market data that we're gaining share" in capital markets [27], while Colliers' chief financial officer says "We have been winning share of market" and that Colliers "added more producers on a percentage basis than they have" [28].

The two firms describe opposite mechanics for the same outcome. JLL's chief executive states that "in our capital markets business we have been able to grow revenue significantly over the last two years without adding additional brokers", attributing the gain to platform productivity [27]. Colliers attributes its gain to headcount and books the cost: adding producers "has been a modest drag on our margins over the last few quarters as we ramp these folks up" [28]. Cushman and Wakefield takes the third position, hiring selectively and pairing it with deleveraging [24].

What is disclosed rather than characterized: Colliers grew FY2025 revenue 15% and net revenue 14%, of which internal revenue growth was 5% in local currency [29]. The distance between 15% and 5% is acquisition and currency, not share. On pricing, the only direct statements come from rivals' risk factors, and both point the same way: JLL cites "increasing commoditization of the services we provide and increasing downward pressure on the fees we can charge" [26], and CBRE states there is "no assurance that we will be able to compete effectively, to maintain current fee levels or margins" [25]. Neither quantifies the pressure.

Portfolios and Their Definitions

Colliers investor presentation [30] and [31]; CBRE FY2025 10-K [8]; JLL FY2025 10-K [32]; Newmark FY2025 10-K [33].

These numbers are not on one measuring stick, and Colliers says so. Its definition of assets under management covers "the gross market value of operating assets and the projected gross cost of development assets", including capital the funds have the right to call from investors, and the company states that "Our definition of AUM may differ from those used by other issuers" [34]. Fee-paying AUM of $55B against total AUM of $110B is the sharper number for revenue purposes, and Colliers also discloses 1,100 institutional limited partners with 87% participating in more than one fund [30].

On the servicing side the difference is scale, not definition. Newmark's primary servicing portfolio was $75.3B at 31 December 2025 against $67.4B a year earlier [33], roughly three and a half times the $21B Colliers shows [31]. Newmark describes that book as "a stable, predictable recurring stream of revenue to us over the life of each loan" that "includes significant prepayment penalties" [35]. Colliers carries risk against its own agency book: under the Fannie Mae Delegated Underwriting and Servicing programme its guarantee is typically up to one-third of any losses on loans originated [36].

How Clients Can Leave

CBRE [25], JLL [37], Cushman and Wakefield [38], Newmark [5], Colliers fund structures [39] and contract policy [40] [20].

The gap between the written term and the observed behaviour is the point of the table. JLL discloses that Workplace Management agreements "are typically three to seven years in duration" but that "most contracts can be terminated at will by the client upon a short notice period (usually 30 to 60 days)", and then adds that "a transition period of six to twelve-months is more common in our industry", that it "typically experience[s] a high renewal rate", and that "many of our largest contracts have been in place for more than a decade" [37]. Legal switching cost is near zero; practical switching cost is a two-quarter transition. Cushman and Wakefield's disclosure is harsher at the leasing end, where "some agreements related to our Leasing service line may be rescinded without notice" [38].

Colliers' own contractual duration sits mainly in Investment Management, where advisory fees are "primarily based on agreed-upon percentages of a fee base (committed capital, assets under management, invested capital, gross asset value or net asset value)" and loan servicing revenue is recognised over the contractual service period [41]. The fund ladder behind that — 31% perpetual capital, 54% long-dated funds on eight or ten year lives, 15% managed accounts — is the longest-dated contractual commitment the company discloses [39]. For the wider business, Colliers defines its resilient revenue as that "derived from Engineering, Outsourcing and Investment Management service lines" carrying "medium to long-term duration revenue streams that are either contractual or repeatable in nature" — a company definition, not a contractual term [34].

The other portability question is people rather than paper. Cushman and Wakefield states that "our industry is subject to a relatively high turnover of brokers and other key revenue producers" [42], which is the mechanism behind the producer-hiring contest recorded above. Colliers entered its most recent reported quarter with double-digit revenue growth across all three platforms and a reaffirmed outlook [43].